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Abstract
The discovery of mirror neurons has suggested a potential neural basis for simulation and common coding theories of
action perception, theories which propose that we understand other people’s actions because perceiving their actions
activates some of our neurons in much the same way as when we perform the actions. We propose testing this model
directly in humans with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) by means of cross-modal classification. Cross-modal
classification evaluates whether a classifier that has learned to separate stimuli in the sensory domain can also separate the
stimuli in the motor domain. Successful classification provides support for simulation theories because it means that the
fMRI signal, and presumably brain activity, is similar when perceiving and performing actions. In this paper we demonstrate
the feasibility of the technique by showing that classifiers which have learned to discriminate whether a participant heard a
hand or a mouth action, based on the activity patterns in the premotor cortex, can also determine, without additional
training, whether the participant executed a hand or mouth action. This provides direct evidence that, while perceiving
others’ actions, (1) the pattern of activity in premotor voxels with sensory properties is a significant source of information
regarding the nature of these actions, and (2) that this information shares a common code with motor execution.
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Introduction
The process of understanding the actions of another person,
even an everyday action such as combing hair, can be performed
at several levels, and potentially involves multiple interrelated
systems [1]. We can understand how the person is performing the
action (such as holding the comb in the right hand), but also what
the person is doing (moving a comb through their hair), and why
they are performing the action (they are getting ready for work)
[1–3]. Simulation [4–8] and common coding [9,10] models of
action perception propose that we understand the how and what of
other people’s actions because viewing or hearing their actions
activates certain brain circuits in much the same way as if we were
executing the actions. While simulation and common coding
models differ in particulars, especially relating to sensory
perception, we will consider them as synonymous here, as they
agree in the realm of action processing. Finally, the why of an
action may be understood by theory of mind processes in an
‘‘inferential reasoning network’’ of cortical midline structures and
the temporo-parietal junction, which may build on, interact with,
or even substitute for the output of the simulation circuits [11,12].
The discovery of mirror neurons [13,14] has suggested a
potential neural basis for the simulation and common coding
models of action perception. For example, hearing someone gurgle
will evoke an inner ‘‘sense’’ of gurgling because the brain activates
some of the same mirror neurons that are active when we gurgle
ourselves [14–16]. Given that both perceiving and executing an
action is not linked to the activity of a single neuron but of a
widespread population of neurons, simulation and common
coding theories can be interpreted as stating that the pattern of
activity while performing an action should resemble the pattern
while observing or listening to a similar action. This resemblance
allows the brain to interpret an activity pattern similarly whether
executing or perceiving. If perception is restated as classification
(was that the sound of action A or action B?) simulation theory
makes a testable prediction: If the pattern of brain activity in a
relevant brain region (i.e. an area with mirror neurons) is similar
during action execution and perception (e.g. listening), a decision
rule which determines whether action A or B was heard on a
particular listening trial should also be able to determine whether
action A or B was performed on a particular execution trial.
Data from single cell recordings in the monkey have been used
to show that mirror neurons in the premotor cortex can indeed be
used to distinguish which of two actions was executed, observed, or
heard [16]. It is possible using fMRI data to compare the pattern
of activity in all voxels in the premotor cortex during the
perception and execution of various actions, and therefore test the
predictions of the simulation theory at the population level.
However, relatively few studies so far have actually measured
brain activity during both the execution and the perception of
multiple actions, and those that have [15,17] have not applied
methods to explicitly test whether the pattern of brain activity
discriminates between actions independently of modality.
Here, we therefore used multivariate classification methods to
directly test this formulation of simulation theory by determining
whether a pattern classifier (a) trained to discriminate two types of
actions (hand and mouth actions) using the pattern of brain
activity while subjects listened to the sounds of these actions, could
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 November 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 11 | e3690(b) classify which of these two types of actions was executed by the
participants using the pattern of brain activity in action execution
trials, patterns not presented to the classifier during training. As a
proof-of-concept test to see whether cross-modal analysis is
possible, we performed the analysis on a suitable existing data
set [15], data previously analyzed with univariate analyses. Of the
evaluated brain regions, cross-modal classification was possible
only using voxels from the premotor cortex, a region thought to
contain mirror neurons in humans, suggesting that this method
may be valuable for testing simulation theory with fMRI data.
Materials and Methods
Data and Experiment
This analysis uses a portion of the data collected in an
experiment investigating the human mirror neuron system in the
auditory domain using univariate analyses [15]. This data set is
suitable for testing the cross-modal classification strategy because
two types of actions (hand and mouth) were presented in two
different modalities (auditory and execution) to the same subjects.
To summarize, the experiment included sixteen healthy volunteers
(14 right- and two left-handed; nine female and seven male; mean
age=31 years, range=25–45 years) with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and normal hearing. The subjects participated in
several tasks, three of which are relevant here: auditory, mouth
movement, and bimanual hand movement.
In the auditory task the subjects listened to the sounds of hand
actions (e.g. ripping paper) and mouth actions (e.g. crunching food) as
well as control sounds (e.g. water dripping). The sound recordings
were four seconds long and were presented in the silent 4.1 second
interval between the acquisition of volumes (acquisition time
1.5 seconds), using a T2* weighted acquisition at 3T (TE=30 ms,
TR=5.6 s,TA=1.5 s,25 axial slices, 4.5 mm thick, 3.563.5 mm in
plane resolution). Each block consisted of three stimuli of the same
category, withthree blocks of eachtype per acquisition run. Four runs
were collected for each subject. For each category of sounds a total of
12 blocks (3 blocks per run for 4 runs) were therefore collected. While
listening to the sounds the subjects performed an odd-ball detection
task; the odd-ballwas the insertion of a different category sound into a
block (e.g. two mouth sound followed by a hand sound). Volumes
collected during odd-ball trials were not analyzed, resulting in at most
nine usable blocks for each stimulus category per subject. Only the
mouth and hand sound blocks will be considered here, to match the
available execution tasks.
The mouth and hand action execution tasks were performed
after the auditory task and without prior warning, to avoid subject
focus on performing movements while listening to the sounds. The
tasks are fully described in Gazzola et. al. [15], as ‘‘MouthExe’’
and ‘‘HandExe.’’ As an overview, the mouth execution task
consisted of manipulating a small plastic object (a garden-type
plastic dwarf 2 cm tall) with the lips while keeping the jaw closed,
while the hand execution task was to rip a piece of paper or break
a peanut with both hands. 16 repetitions of each action were
collected (eight each of peanut breaking and paper tearing), in
different runs for each effector. The mouth execution task lasted
4 seconds, while the hand actions lasted about 5 seconds, with the
duration of movement recorded and used as block length. In both
cases the individual actions were separated by rest periods of
1062 seconds, and cued visually in a single event design.
The data were temporally compressed by generating one
summary volume per block. Temporal compression reduces the
risk of confounding the classification with excessive block and time-
dependent factors (i.e. due to the hemodynamic response lag; see
also [18]). Summary volumes for each block were calculated using
SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London,
UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) by fitting a GLM with
separate parameter estimates for each block. These parameter
estimates were used as the measure of brain activity for each block,
creating ‘‘parameter estimate images’’ [19,20]. Prior to parameter
estimation the volumes were high-pass filtered, realigned, and
normalized (but not smoothed) as described in [15] using SPM2,
except that 4 mm voxels were used; this size was chosen to have
fewer voxels per ROI while maintaining the greatest possible spatial
resolution given the scanning parameters. For each subject this
results in 9 parameter estimate images for mouth sounds, 9 for hand
sounds, 16 for mouth execution, and 16 for hand execution.
Regions-of-Interest (ROIs)
This analysis was carried out with a region of interest (ROI)-
based methodology, using all of the voxels in each ROI. The ROIs
were chosen based on our simulation theory-derived hypotheses
prior to analysis; brain activity measured in the subjects did not
influence the choice of ROIs. Five ROIs were selected: the
premotor cortex (preM) because it is seen as central to the mirror
neuron system in monkeys [5,7,13,14,16] and humans [6,8,21–
26]; primary (S1) and secondary somatosensory cortices (S2)
[1,6,27–29], areas hypothesized to participate in somatosensory
aspects of simulation; and finally the primary auditory cortex (aud)
and primary motor cortex (M1), due to the nature of the tasks
(auditory and motor). Each ROI was chosen individually on the
left and right side. The probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps from
the SPM Anatomy Toolbox [30] were used to create the ROIs.
Although the posterior parietal cortex has been implicated in the
mirror neuron system, this region is not included as a ROI because
of the lack of cytoarchitectonically-defined maps of the superior
parietal lobule. As an exploratory analysis we analyzed a portion of
the parietal lobe identified functionally, please see Text S1 for
details. A further area (other) was included as a negative control: a
comparison set of voxels which should not contain information
suitable for classification of action sounds or action execution. The
other area was made up of the early visual cortex and the amygdala,
and was of comparable size to the largest ROIs (Table 1).
The voxels in each ROI were further processed to exclude
voxels which had zero variance across parameter estimate images
in any subject because voxels with zero variance cannot contribute
classification information. Including only voxels with non-zero
variance in all subjects ensures that each ROI is the same size in all
subjects, facilitating the comparison of results across subjects, but
potentially eliminating voxels which contain classification infor-
mation in a subset of subjects. The ImCalc function in SPM2 was
used to transform the masks to the same shape and voxel size as
the parameter estimate images. The number of voxels and specific
SPM Anatomy Toolbox areas composing each ROI, as well as
other, are listed in Table 1. The ROIs are shown in Figure S1.
Classification Procedure
Support vector machines (svms) [31,32] were used as the
classifier for this analysis. All analyses were performed in R [33],
using the e1071 package’s svm command with a linear kernel,
cost=1, and default scaling (to zero mean and unit variance).
These choices are similar to those previously used with fMRI data
[34–39]. The classification was done within-subjects, with the
results averaged across subjects. For cross-modal classification a
classifier was trained to distinguish mouth and hand sounds for
each subject and ROI separately, using the nine sound parameter
estimate images for each condition as the training set. The
classifiers were then presented with execution data to classify as the
test set; no execution task data were used during training. The
Cross-Modal Classification
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images was used as the classification accuracy for the subject and
ROI. Stated another way, the classifiers determined whether an
execution trial was more similar to the hand or mouth sound
activation pattern.
Given that only ,10% of neurons in the premotor cortex
respond to the sound of actions [14,16] while virtually all respond
during the execution of actions, training a classifier on auditory data
and testing it on execution data is preferable to the reverse
procedure because it ensures that the classifiers focus on the subset
of voxels that do contain sensory information (and are therefore
likely to be mirror). The results, therefore, do not show that the
activity pattern of a cortex overall is similar during action execution
and perception, but that those voxels with sensory properties show
an activity pattern that is similar during perception and action.
The significance of the classification accuracy for each ROI was
determined by a permutation test which determines how likely it is
to get an accuracy as high as the one observed (similar to the
procedure described in [40]). This is done by testing the null
hypothesis that there is no relationship between the test data class
labels (mouth or hand) and the voxel activity pattern. A lack of
relationship is ensured by randomly permuting the test data labels.
There are too many possible permutations to do a complete
permutation test (32C16>10
8), so a random permutation test was
performed by calculating the accuracy of 1000 random data
relabelings (i.e. randomly reordering the ‘‘mouth’’ and ‘‘hand’’
execution labels, using the same ordering for each subject). The
classification accuracyofeachrelabeleddata setisdetermined inthe
same manner as for the actual data set, and the average across-
subjects accuracy computed. The p-value is then determined by
counting the proportion of relabeled data sets classified more
accurately than the true data set. As 1000 relabelings were
computed the maximum significance level possible is 1/
1001=0.001 [41,42]. Significance was evaluated by t-tests as well,
by evaluating the likelihood that the true overall mean accuracy of
the 16 subjects is greater than 0.5 (chance level). In our opinion the
permutation test is more appropriate for this data since it does not
require distributional assumptions and directly tests the hypothesis
of interest, so permutation test p-values will be used in the text,
although t-test p-values are also reported for interested readers.
In addition to the cross-modal classification, uni-modal classifica-
tion was performed by classifying the data from the sound trialsalone.
Uni-modal classification indicates how accurately each ROI was able
to distinguish the sound data. In brief, this was carried out by making
training sets of all but one mouth and all but one hand action sound
block per subject, with the remaining two examples used as the test
set. Every example was used once in a test set (stratified nine-fold
cross-validation), pairing test samples collected closest together in
time. Performance was quantified as the test set accuracy, averaged
over the nine test sets for each subject. Significance was calculated by
a complete permutation test (performed pairwisein order to maintain
stratification) and a one-sided t-test (true mean greater than 0.5), as
for the cross-modal analysis.
Results
Of the ten ROIs, significant (p,0.005) cross-modal classification
was possible only using the left and right premotor cortex (Table 2).
Examining the classification performance of the ROIs using the
auditory data alone (Table 3) shows that the superior classification
accuracy of the premotor cortex was specific for cross-modal
classification: several ROIs, auditory in particular, classified sounds
more accurately than premotor, but their higher accuracy did not
carry across modalities. The highest uni-modal classification
accuracy was obtained in aud L; aud R, S2 L, S2R, preM L, preM
R, and S1 L, could also classify significantly above chance (Table 3).
The patterns in M1 L, M1 R, and S1 R could not be classified.
The other areas were included to serve as a comparison set of
voxels which should not contain information suitable for
classification of action sounds or action execution. Other serves as
a sort of negative control, to check that cross-modal classification
accuracy is not simply something that is possible in any group of
voxels from this data. It is possible that some stimulus-relevant
activity exists in these areas, due to cross-talk with other brain
regions. This does not diminish their value as a negative control if
the classification accuracy of these regions is indistinguishable from
Table 1. Naming scheme and number of 46464 mm voxels in each ROI and brain area.
ROI or Area Anatomy Toolbox areas side abbreviation number of voxels
total without somatotopic
premotor cortex BA 44, BA 6 left preM L 396 386
right preM R 385 376
auditory cortex TE 1.0, TE 1.1, TE 1.2 left aud L 55
right aud R 61
secondary somatosensory cortex OP1, OP2, OP3, OP4 left S2 L 159
right S2 R 162
primary motor cortex BA 4a, BA 4p left M1 L 183
right M1 R 147
primary somatosensory cortex BA 1, BA 2, BA 3a, BA 3b left S1 L 262
right S1 R 351
other CM/LB/SF; BA 17, BA 18, hOC5 left other L 391
right other R 348
The given voxel counts are the number of voxels used in the analyses (the number that remain after removing all voxels with zero variance across volumes in any
subject), both in each ROI and after removing somatotopic voxels; see text for details. The ‘‘Anatomy Toolbox areas’’ column lists the regions selected to make up each
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and cross-modal analyses (Table 4).
The previous group analysis of the data from this experiment
[15] provided evidence for a somatotopic mirror neuron system,
portions of which overlap the ROIs considered here. If
classification accuracy remains significant when the voxels shown
to have somatotopic properties in the group analysis are excluded,
we have evidence that cross-modal multivariate pattern classifica-
tion relies upon additional sources of information: patterns present
in voxels previously not identified as containing significant
information. To investigate this possibility the voxels identified
as somatotopic in [15] (using mass-univariate analysis at the group
level) were removed from the premotor ROIs and the cross-modal
analysis was repeated. Specifically, the voxels shown in yellow and
red in Figure S4 frame D of [15] were removed (see Figure S2).
This is a larger group of voxels than that used in the primary
results of [15] since they meet a less stringent definition of
somatotopy, and so provide a more difficult classification
challenge. The number of voxels remaining in the left and right
premotor ROIs after removing these somatotopic voxels is listed in
Table 1. Removing these voxels had little effect on the cross-modal
classification accuracy (Table 2): significant (p,0.005) cross-modal
classification was still found in the left and right premotor cortex.
Discussion
The main result of this report is that cross-modal classification
was possible: pattern classifiers could determine whether an
executed action involved the hand or the mouth using the pattern
of brain activity in the premotor cortex after having been trained
to discriminate the activity pattern while subjects listened to the
sound of hand and mouth actions. Since the classifiers were
trained on the sound data this does not show that the activity
pattern of the premotor cortex as a whole is similar during action
execution and perception, but rather that those voxels with sensory
properties show an activity pattern that is similar during
perception and action. Of the ROIs tested, only the premotor
cortex had significant cross-modal classification, which informs the
debate of whether motor or somatosensory simulation dominates
social perception [14–16,43–45]. This shows that one of the core
predictions of simulation and common coding theories is correct: a
pattern classifier that has learnt to decode which action was heard
based on the pattern of brain activity in the premotor cortex
during action perception trials can successfully deduce which
action was executed in action execution trials. In particular, these
results show that multivariate pattern classifiers can be used to
study simulation and common coding theories. Whether areas
Table 2. Mean cross-modal classification accuracy and p-values of each ROI as determined by permutation and t-testing, both of
the entire ROI and after removing the voxels identified as somatotopic; see text for details.
ROI all voxels without somatotopic voxels
mean s.e.m. perm p-value t-test p-value mean s.e.m. perm p-value t-test p-value
preM L 0.5449 0.0232 0.005* 0.0358 0.543 0.023 0.0040* 0.0406
preM R 0.5664 0.0197 0.001* 0.0021* 0.5586 0.0215 0.0030* 0.0078
M1 L 0.4727 0.0299 0.9441 0.8125
M1 R 0.4863 0.0331 0.7343 0.6571
S1 L 0.5352 0.0224 0.043 0.069
S1 R 0.5059 0.0225 0.3866 0.3991
S2 L 0.5176 0.0213 0.1788 0.2115
S2 R 0.5156 0.0278 0.2517 0.2912
aud L 0.5508 0.0238 0.014 0.0251
aud R 0.5312 0.0278 0.0679 0.1394
*p,0.0050 (Bonferroni correction of 0.05 for 10 ROIs).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003690.t002





preM L 0.5729 0.0478 0.002* 0.0739
preM R 0.5729 0.0382 0.002* 0.0378
M1 L 0.5521 0.0364 0.0176 0.0864
M1 R 0.5069 0.0408 0.1037 0.4336
S1 L 0.6181 0.0464 0.002* 0.0113
S1 R 0.5174 0.0453 0.0607 0.3534
S2 L 0.5868 0.0336 0.002* 0.0104
S2 R 0.625 0.0435 0.002* 0.0058
aud L 0.6389 0.0296 0.002* 0.0001*
aud R 0.5938 0.0294 0.002* 0.0031*
*p,0.0050 (Bonferroni correction of 0.05 for 10 ROIs).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003690.t003
Table 4. Mean uni-modal (train and test on listening data)
and cross-modal (train on listening, test on execution)
classification accuracy and p-values of the other areas.





other L uni-modal 0.5382 0.0426 0.0254 0.1923
cross-modal 0.5332 0.0201 0.0549 0.0594
other R uni-modal 0.4618 0.0242 0.3366 0.9325
cross-modal 0.5332 0.0227 0.0559 0.0823
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003690.t004
Cross-Modal Classification
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across modality, and might therefore also participate in simulation
and common coding, remains a question for future research, with
the parietal cortex being an obvious candidate (see Text S1).
However, we need to consider what it means to find a classification
accuracyof57% correct with p,0.005 (thresholdof0.05,Bonferroni-
corrected for ten ROIs). Humans can discriminate hand and mouth
actions much more accurately than this, typically .90% correct [15].
Does that mean that the premotor cortex cannot be the neural basis
for such discrimination? In mass-univariate fMRI analysis the
absolute difference between two conditions is always minimal
(typically less than 1% of the BOLD signal), but if the difference is
unlikely to have occurred by chance (p,0.05 corrected for multiple
c o m p a r i s o n )ab r a i nr e g i o ni sc o n s i d e r e dt ob ei n v o l v e di nt h et a s k .
The fact that the difference is small in absolute terms is unsurprising
because fMRI is only a very indirect and noisy measure of neural
activity. Translated to multivariate analysis, significant above-chance
classification, independently of its absolute value, should therefore be
considered to provide similarly meaningful evidence that the region
has task-relevant information–but at the level of patterns of activity.
This is why recent reports [e.g. 20,46] consider the significance of
classification accuracies more important than their absolute values:
because BOLD is such an indirect measure of neural activity. The
fact that the absolute value of classification accuracy is lower than that
of humans simply reflects the degradation of the neural signal along
the causal chain of fMRI measurements. In this specific case, the
degradation is especially severe because cross-modal action classifi-
cation suffers from two additional problems. First, mirror neurons
preferring hand actions are sometimes recorded so closely to those
preferring mouth actions that their activity could cancel each other
out within the volume of our fMRI voxels [16]. Second, only about
10% of motor neurons are mirror [14,16] and classifiers, unlike the
brain, which may somehow focus on the activity in these mirror
neurons, therefore have to pick the 10% mirror ‘signal’ out of the
90% non-mirror ‘noise’. In light of these considerations, above-
chance classification across modality based on fMRI signals should be
seen as an experimental proxy to examine whether there is evidence
for patterns of activity at the neural level that would support even
more reliable classification. It is hoped that even greater significance,
and perhaps higher classification accuracy levels, may be possible
when analyzing data from experiments specifically designed to test
cross-modal classification. We are currently beginning such an
experiment.
This report describes an analysis technique which we believe can
provide the most direct support for simulation [4–8] and common
coding [9,10] theories possible with fMRI. Classical univariate
analysisusingthesamedata [15] could onlyshowthat certainvoxels
‘preferred’ the same type of actions (hand or mouth) both during
listening and execution. This finding leaves unanswered the
essential question of whether the brain could use this information
to perceive which action another individual is performing at a
particular point in time in terms of the listener’s own actions. One
reason is that, while differences are present at the group level,
activity in other voxels could obscure the information at the
individual level, for instance by responding more to hand actions
during listening and more to mouth actions during execution. An
additional limitation for interpretation is that for an individual to
perceiveactions accurately requires thattheactivitypatterninduced
byaction perceptionisreliablefromtrial totrial, whereastraditional
group analyses focus on determining whether activity is similar from
person to person (averaging across trials at the first level of analysis).
Here, separate multivariate classifiers were trained for each
individual, thus identifying patterns which were similar across trials
for that individual. Cross-modal classification directly indicates that
the pattern of activity in the premotor cortices, with all its individual
peculiarities, is similar enough during the execution and perception
of actions–at least in voxels with sensory properties since the
classifiers were trained on the auditory data–to provide the listener
with a way to perceive the actions of others through his/her own
actions. The multivariate approach thus provides a fundamental
advantage over mass-univariate approaches for this purpose, and
we hope that the present paper, using pattern classification to
investigate simulation theories, will prove to be a powerful new tool
to investigate the idea of common coding at the level of neural
populations as measured using fMRI.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Cross-Modal Classification of a Parietal Region.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003690.s001 (0.12 MB
DOC)
Figure S1 The ROIs in a glass brain representation, rendered
on the mean anatomy of the 16 subjects with maximum
transparency depth. The ROIs on each side are shown with the
same color for clarity, although always analyzed separately on the
left and right sides. See Table 1 for the derivation and size of each
ROI.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003690.s002 (1.02 MB TIF)
Figure S2 Slices showing the voxels omitted from the premotor
cortex, superimposed on the mean anatomy; see the Results for a
description of the procedure. The slice numbers are given first as
analyzed (4 mm64m m 64 mm voxels), followed by the Talairach
coordinate slice numbers in parentheses. Starting at the upper left
and moving left to right, these are slices z=14 (54 to 58), z=17
(67 to 69), z=24 (94 to 98), z=25 (99 to 101), z=29 (115 to 117),
and z=30 (118 to 122).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003690.s003 (2.03 MB TIF)
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